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The Challenges of Good Corporate Governance
for Effective Risk-Based Banking Supervision
Chris C. Itsede, Ph.D*

I.

Introduction

C

orporate governance has changed tremendously over the past two
decades. These changes have been driven by new laws, regulations,
guidelines and rising investor and public expectations. In the past, many
boards were under the thumb of their chief executive officers (CEOs); this is no
longer the case. Today, boards generally strive to govern their companies by
benchmarking a set of best practices which have emerged and codified in
corporate governance laws, stock exchange listing rules and company annual
reports. Many individual directors are willing to accept these additional
responsibilities.
A major development in corporate governance in recent years is the increasing
emphasis on independent directors on the boards of companies to ensure
objectivity and avoid conflict of interest. The downside is that boards get stuffed
with directors (mainly non-executive) who have little institutional knowledge of
the company and its business. Directors' inadequate knowledge is often
compounded by the quality of information from management, especially where it
is excessive and poorly organized. Another handicap relates to vague unclear
roles, duties and responsibilities. As a result, many boards carry on business as
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usual without much reflection on what they ought to be doing.
The financial crisis that hit the East Asian economies in the late 1990s and the
collapse of a large number of high profile large US firms including Enron
Corporation, Worldcom and Arthur Andersen have heightened interest in good
governance practices. In both instances, lack of good corporate governance
mechanisms leading to institutional weaknesses was blamed for the losses and
resultant instability. The crises cast into bold relief the fact that risk factors
inherent in banking need to be tackled head-on and that mechanisms to identify,
measure and control risks are required to detect and correct potential problems
early. Against this backdrop, corporate governance and risk-based bank
supervision have come to be acknowledged as fundamental guiding principles for
a stable and efficient banking/financial system.
The banking industry is changing with a dynamic world. It is increasingly
characterized by a complexity of products and services, internationalization of
financial services, mergers and acquisitions, a convergence of products and
regulatory practices across the fmancial services sector. Yet, there is a growing
pressure to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the regulatory function.
The supervisory response has been to move away from the beaten track of
compliance supervision, compliance reviews and rule-based model toward riskbased supervision, focused reviews and reliance on work of other actors such as
the board ofdirectors and regulators.

11.0 Good Corporate Governance
Corporate governance is regarded generally as the set of structures, processes,
principles and policies affecting the way an institution is directed, administered
and controlled. It includes the relationships amongst the many stakeholders
involved and the goals for which the institution is governed. The principal

Itsede: The Challenges of Good Corporate Governance for Effective Risk-Based Supervision

171

stakeholders are shareholders, board of directors and management. Others
include employees, suppliers, customers, regulators, environment, and the
community at large.
11.1 Definitions
A number of definitions of corporate governance provided by writers and experts
on the subject reveal clearly the issues involved. The definitions include the
following:
a)
The Code of Corporate Governance issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria
(CBN) defines corporate governance as "a system by which corporations
are governed and controlled with a view to increasing shareholder value
and meeting the expectations of the other stakeholders."
b)
"Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are
directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the
distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in
the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and other
stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions
on corporate affairs. By doing so, it also provides the structure through
which the company's objectives are set and the means of attaining those
objectives and monitoring performance." (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 1999).
c)
"Corporate governance is about promoting corporate fairness,
transparency and accountability" (J. Wolfensohn (1999), former President
of the World Bank).

Underlying the definitions of corporate governance is the principal-agent
problem which actually gives rise to the need for good corporate governance. The
principalagent problem is the recognition of the separation of ownership from
control in a typical corporation, implying a loss of effective control by
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shareholders over managerial decisions. The quest to reduce or eliminate the
principal-agent problem in an organization is the justification for mechanisms and
processes of corporate governance, ensuring the accountability of certain
individuals.

Il.2

Importance of Corporate Governance

Good corporate governance is a tool for socio-economic development. It ensures
the integrity of corporations, financial institutions and markets which is
particularly central to the health ofour economies and societies and their stability.

Il.3

Principles of corporate governance

All parties to corporate governance have an interest, directly or indirectly, in the
effective performance of the organization. Directors, workers and management
receive salaries, benefits and reputation, while shareholders receive capital
return. Customers receive goods and services and suppliers receive compensation
for their goods and services. In return, these individuals provide value in the form
of natural, human, social and other forms of capital. To promote and protect the
interests of all stakeholders, the following key, commonly-accepted principles of
corporate governance are prescribed:
a)

b)
c)

Rights and equitable treatment of shareholders: Organizations should
respect the rights of shareholders and help shareholders to exercise those
rights. They can help shareholders exercise their rights by effectively
communicating information that is understandable and accessible and
encouraging shareholders to participate in general meetings.
Interests of other stakeholders: Organizations should recognize that they
have legal and other obligations to all legitimate stakeholders.
Role and responsibilities of the Board: The board needs a range of skills
and understanding to be able to deal with various business issues and have
the ability to review and challenge management performance. It needs to
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be of sufficient size and have an appropriate level of commitment to fulfill
its responsibilities and duties. There are issues about the appropriate mix
of executive and non-executive directors. The key roles of chairperson
and CEO should not be held by the same person.
Integrity and ethical behaviour: Ethical and responsible decision-making
is not only important for public relations, but it is also a necessary element
in risk management and avoiding lawsuits. Organizations should develop
a code of conduct for their directors and executives which promotes ethical
and responsible decision-making.
Disclosure and Transparency: Organizations should clarify and make
publicly known the roles and responsibilities of board and management
with a view to providing shareholders with a level of accountability. They
should also implement procedures to independently verify and safeguard
the integrity of the company's financial reporting. Disclosure of matters
concerning the organization should be timely and balanced to ensure that
all investors have access to clear and factual information. In summary,
good corporate governance is actually adherence to the tenets of corporate
governance.

m.o

Risk-Based Banking Supervision
Banking supervision is the process of monitoring to ensure that banking
institutions conduct their businesses in accordance with regulations and in a
prudent manner. The primary goal of banking supervision is the promotion of a
stable, safe and sound banking system, a critical condition for financial markets
stability and sustainable economic growth. Specifically, the objectives ofbanking
supervision are to
•
Ensure financial system stability
•
•

Protect public interest depositors, shareholders, creditors etc.
Improve efficiency offmancial institutions
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Ensure compliance with statutory/regulatory requirements.

In the past few decades, rapid technological changes, deregulation, globalization
and internationalization of financial flows, increasing financial innovations,
economic regionalism, and financial market failures, including the Asian crises of
the late 1990s have contributed to a paradigm shift in approach to banking
supervision. A rules or compliance-based approach to supervision was in
operation up to 1998 and for some time thereafter. The approach involved the use
of rating systems and the review of prudential returns to grade a bank. Two (2)
examples ofrating systems, SLEMS and CAMEL, are provided below:
SLEMS
Solvency (S)

CAMEL
- capital adequacy, asset quality, risk concentration

Liquidity (L) - statutory, operational, concentration in assets & Liabilities
Earnings (E)

- ROA, ROE, cost / income

C - Capital
Adequacy
A - Asset Quality

Managem ent (M) - governance, regulatory compliance, H R develop men t

M - Managem ent

Systems (S)

E - Earnings

- portfolio m anagement, accounting, MIS internal audit
and controls

L - Liquidity
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Toe review of relevant prudential returns and reports against pre-determined
criteria complemented the system. The compliance-based approach being largely
reactionary proved unable to cope with emerging challenges associated with the
evolving complexities of the international financial system especially in the face
of electronic payments products.

ID.1 The BasleAccords-New Paradigm
In 1998, the Basie Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced the
Basle Accord (Basle I) to replace the compliance-based approach. This was the
birth of risk-based banking supervision (RBBS), a proactive and relatively more
efficient supervisory process. Basie I is a framework of 25 principles or
recommendations on banking laws and regulations primarily focused on credit
risk and prescribing a set of minimal capital requirements for banks, now widely
viewed as outmoded.

In 2004, a more comprehensive set of guidelines, Basie II was introduced. Basie
II uses a "three pillars" concept to promote greater stability in the financial system
(1) minimum capital requirements addressing quantifiable risks, (2) supervisory
review, and (3) market discipline. Under Pillar 1, more intensive procedures for
computing risk-sensitive minimum capital requirements, particularly credit risk,
operational risk and market risk are developed. Other risks are not considered
fully quantifiable at this stage. Enhancing oversight and supervisory review is the
focus of Pillar 2. It provides improved tools to regulators/supervisors and a
framework for dealing with all other risks systemic risk, strategic risk,
reputational risk, liquidity risk, legal risk (all known as residual risk). The
promotion of greater market discipline through policies that compel banks to
disclose accurate, transparent, and complete information to market players and
the pub lie is provided under Pillar 3.
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m.2 Modalities of Risk-Based Banking Supervision
The practice of RBBS requires that banks bear responsibilities for understanding
and managing their risk profiles and for putting in place adequate risk
management structures and procedures. Banks are permitted to use their own
estimates to calculate their capital requirements based on their estimated risks.
The risk management frameworks of banks are reviewed by bank supervisors
who must have the authority and expertise to intervene in risk management
processes. Supervisors assess all risks a bank may face including, credit risk,
systemic risk, liquidity risk, strategic risk, reputation risk and legal risk.
Supervisory review develops and maintains a risk matrix for each bank and
prepares a supervisory plan that is relevant to the current risk profile of a bank and
enables the supervisor to optimize resource use by focusing on banks with a high
risk profile or with high risk areas.
Supervisors continuously monitor and evaluate the risks profiles of banks in
relation to their business strategies and peculiar risks and also the bank's risk
management procedures and models for determining economic capital. In
comprehensively dealing with current and emerging risks of banks, RBBS places
an effective guard on banking/financial sector stability.
IV.O

Interplay of Good Corporate Governance and Risk-Based Banking
Supervision
Banking is a business and its viability depends on the ability to make profit.
This process is associated with some risks. Yet risk taking remains a vital and
indispensible aspect of banking. The important thing is to accept that risks
cannot be eliminated but may only be mitigated through proper management.
As T. S. Fortune put it, "Risk let's get it straight upfront is good. The point of
risk management is not to eliminate it; that would eliminate reward.' In other
words, we define risk management as the process of identifying, measuring,
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monitoring and controlling risk. The objective is to optimize risk-reward tradeoff.
Four key elements identified by bank supervisors as critical to good risk
management are good corporate governance; consistent application of policies,
processes, procedures and limits; use of appropriate risk-measurement
techniques and reporting; and adoption ofcomprehensive internal controls. While
the first factor explicitly recognizes good corporate governance, the other factors
are all aspects of good corporate governance. In other words, good risk
management or risk-based banking supervision totally depends on good
corporate governance. Good corporate governance in the central bank and in
banks promotes effective risk-based banking supervision and effective
management of risks in banks. The converse is equally the case. Poor or weak
corporate governance in the central bank and/or in banks will undermine effective
risk-based banking supervision and effective management ofrisks in banks.

IV.I Model of Interplay between Good Corporate Governance and RBBS
The inter-linkages between good corporate governance, RBBS, financial system
stability and economic growth are illustrated in the model presented below.
Good Corporate
Governance
Effective risk-based banking

supefVislon

Rnancial System
Stabllity

Promotion ot

Economic growth

.,.
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Risk based supervision allows banks to take risks so long as they show ability
to manage and price for those risks. Risk-based supervision treats each bank
on a case-by-case basis, taking into cognizance, each bank's demonstrated
ability to manage risks. It does not subject well-managed banks to the same
operating rules as the weak ones.

IV.2 Co-incidence of Interests
Good corporate governance and RBBS share a number of common interests: the
soundness and efficiency of banking institutions, the long-term sustainability of
banking/financial systems, protection of the investments of shareholders,
depositors and the interests of other stakeholders, transparency and effectiveness
of administration, and reliability of information disclosed. This is to be expected
as both practices are inteiwoven.
IV.3 Issues and Challenges
As good corporate governance is pursued and integrated into the RBBS, a number
of issues and challenges will need to be addressed by banks and central banks:
a)
Empowerment of shareholders and directors for general effective
oversight
b)
Capacity of the Board to establish strategic direction, operational
standards, risk tolerances and monitoring systems;
•
The Board must have the capability to effect the above.
•
A well-designed monitoring system will allow the Board to hold
management accountable for operating within established
tolerances.
c)
Capable management and appropriate staffmg essential to risk
management.
•
Retaining and recruiting capable executives, line managers,
risk management personnel and back-office staff can be daunting
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in today's competitive job market;
•
Skills and expertise of management staff must be commensurate
with products and services offered by the bank;
•
Skills and expertise of risk management personnel must be
commensurate with variety and complexity of risks faced by
bank;
Installation of effective risk management structures and procedures
(policies/processes/control systems, risk-based auditing, management
information systems etc.);
Monitoring of efficacy ofrisk management operations (compliance units);
Reporting on risk management performance.
Compliance with code of corporate governance. For example, despite the
CBN's Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria, the following
undesirable conditions/activities appear to persist.
Ineffective Board Statutory Audit Committee
Inadequate operational and financial controls
Lack of transparency in operation, market efficiency and discipline
Board/Management squabbles.

For supervisors, the pursuance of good corporate governance as an integral part of
RBBS requires preparedness to effectively implement RBBS, development of a
code of corporate governance for banks and capacity for effective monitoring of
banks' corporate governance performance. These are formidable, timeconsuming challenges given the pre-RBBS conditions of central banks and banks
and the huge investments in staff capacity building, institutional infrastructure
and consultancy services necessary for the transition to RBBS.
For example, bank regulators and supervisors must rise to the high ground of
expertise and understanding of emerging market instruments and practices to
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develop models, assumptions and risk views of banks, and certify the risk
management of banks. They should be able to assess the quality of a bank's
procedures for evaluating, monitoring, managing and controlling risks and the
bank's models for determining economic capital. Banks and bank supervisors
need to deal with these challenges of good corporate governance for RBBS.

V
Way Forward
All stakeholders in the banking system have responsibilities for good corporate
governance and banks, in particular, have responsibilities for risk-based banking
superv1s1on. From experience, it cannot be taken for granted that these
responsibilities are appreciated well-enough. Rather, continuous emphasis and
enforcement of these responsibilities are needed more now than ever before. The
current international financial crises have been attributed to long-standing
inadequate regulation. Nobel Laureate, Professor Joseph Stiglitz argues that
stronger regulation relating to corporate governance, pay, lending practices etc. is
necessary if the world is to avoid a similar crisis in the future. Indeed, the failures
of regulation and supervision will always lead to disaster for banking and
financial systems. Thus, re-dedication and practical commitment to the
responsibilities and principles by banks and central banks are required for the way
forward with respect to corporate governance and RBBS:
•
Ownership and enforcement by the Boards of a code of corporate
governance.
•
The Board must satisfy itself that the implementation, integrity and
maintenance of effective risk management systems are not compromised.
•
Management must keep directors adequately informed about risk-taking
activities.
•
Management must ensure that strategic direction and risk tolerances are
effectively communicated and adhered to throughout the organization.
The quality of supporting human resource and organizational orientation
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and back-up need to be addressed.
Management must oversee the development and maintenance of
management information systems to ensure that information is timely,
accurate and pertinent.
Central banks must make the investments required for the successful
implementation of risk-based banking supervision through addressing
human resource development in risk-based supervision, infrastructural
support and risk-based auditing.
Establishment ofrisk-based internal audit and functional compliance units
and management review oftheir operations.

VI
Conclusion
We have witnessed m today's world the near-collapse of the international
fmancial system, which reverberated across many continents and national
economies. Good corporate governance in financial institutions and effective
risk-based banking supervision in banks possess the strength to stave off this
adversity. It rests with boards, management, regulators and supervisors of
banking/financial institutions to operate according to the tenets of good corporate
governance and risk-based banking supervision to spare the world from future
financial crises.

